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The contemporary global political economy is characterised by synergies and dichotomies 
between globalism and regionalisms. While this is not new, it has taken on added currency in 
recent years with the intensification of globalization and trade liberalization. As Hettne and   
Söderbaum contend, regional integration is “…a complex process of change simultaneously 
involving state as well as non-state actors and occurring as a result of global, regional, national 
and local level forces.”  For them, regions are viewed as “emerging phenomenon, ambiguously 
both forming part of and driving, as well as reacting against and modifying the global order.”
1 
The European Union (EU) is the most advanced and sophisticated regional project, and provides 
a useful reference point, as a model of governance beyond the sovereign state. This paper argues, 
however, that the motivation for regionalism in the North is different from that in the South.  As 
Hettne et al remind us, core regions are coherent, politically strong, well organized at the 
supranational level, not only economically growing but leading in technological innovation.  Core 
regions are ‘policy-makers’ which organize for the sake of being better able to control the rest of 
the world, the world outside of their own region and compete among themselves in exercising this 
influence.  Peripheral regions are ‘policy-takers’ since they are politically more turbulent and 
economically more stagnant.  Consequently they have to organize in order to stop the threat of 
marginalization.  At the same time their regional arrangements are fragile and ineffective.
2   
Therefore, for the developing world, regional integration is both necessary and 
problematic. While this is not new, global forces have generated renewed urgency for integration 
in the South. Within this context the paper examines the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). As 
the Caribbean seeks to navigate the global environment regional integration continues to be a 
necessary imperative.  As such there have been concrete steps toward deeper integration, for 
example, the establishment of the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) and the launch of the 
Caribbean Single Market (CSM) in 2005 and 2006 respectively.  Yet, despite those visible 
attempts to deepen integration, the emerging institutional design still caters for a minimalist
3 
form of integration. The paper argues that after thirty-four years, the Caribbean is coming of age, 
but with inherent deficiencies. 
The paper is structured in three parts. Following this introduction the first section 
examines some theoretical imperatives. Second, it analyses the current state of Caribbean 
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  3integration, mindful of the significance of the EU model as a frame of reference. The final section 




There is an ongoing debate as to what is ‘regionalism’ and ‘regionalization’. The New 
Regionalism Theory (NRT) distinguishes between these two concepts. On the one hand, 
‘regionalism’ represents the body of ideas, values and concrete objectives that are aimed at 
creating, maintaining or modifying the provision of security and wealth, peace and development 
within a region.  On the other hand, ‘regionalization’ denotes the empirical process which can be 
defined as a process of change from relative heterogeneity and lack of cooperation towards 
increased cooperation, integration, convergence, coherence and identity in a variety of fields such 
as culture, security, economic development and politics within a given geographic space.
4   
 
Regional Integration and Development 
 
Scholars in the developing world have often stressed the relationship between integration and 
development. As Axline
5  indicates, while classical theories have been successfully applied to 
Western Europe, in the case of the developing world, an understanding of regional integration 
requires a different theoretical approach born out of an understanding of the world’s political 
economy.  In this context, regional integration is viewed as ‘collective self reliance’ which 
provides member countries with a stronger platform with which to interact with the global 
economy and pursue relations with other groups and countries. This perspective underscores the 
point that regional integration is not an end in itself but can be evaluated in terms of its 
contribution to development.  
    With the emergence of the NRT the concept of ‘development regionalism’ has gained 
potency. There are seven main arguments for development regionalism. First, is the sufficient size 
argument. That is, regionalism is imperative, particularly in the case of micro-states which either 
have to cooperate to solve common problems or become client states of the ‘core countries’.  
Second, the NRT agues that self-reliance is rarely viable on the national level.  However, it may 
yet be a feasible development strategy at the regional level, if it is defined as coordination of 
production, improvement of infrastructure and making use of complementarities.  
Third, NRT holds that economic policies may be more stable and consistent if 
underpinned by regional arrangements which cannot be broken by a participant country without 
some kind of sanctions from the others.  This refers to the credibility argument.  Fourth, 
collective bargaining on the regional level could improve the economic position of marginalized 
countries in the world system, or protect the structural position and market access of successful 
export countries. Fifth, regionalism can counter the disruptions caused by globalization and 
uneven development, reinforcing societal viability by including social security issues and an 
element of redistribution in the regionalist project. Thus the social stability argument refers to the 
allocation of regional funds to support less developed economies within the regional movement.  
Sixth, regional environmental security complexes constitute imperatives for regional 
cooperation.  Finally, successful regional conflict resolution could eliminate distorted investment 
patterns, making resources locked in the ‘security fund’ (military expenditures) available for 
                                                           
    
4 Michael Schultz, et al.  (eds.) Regionalization in a Globalizing World. (London and New York:  Zed Books, 2000) 
5. 
    
5 See Andrew W. Axline. “Underdevelopment, Dependence and Integration. The Politics of Regionalism in the Third 
World.”  International Organization 31 (Winter 1977): 83-105. 
 
  4more productive use (the peace dividend argument).  As such, regionalism can become a factor 
counteracting hegemony and preventing non-democratic trends in the periphery.
6   
Against this background, the large question is, what type of regional projects are 
emerging in the South in the contemporary era and to what extent are they modeled after the EU? 
The following section uses the case of the CARICOM to discuss these questions. 
 





Any discussion of Caribbean integration, must take into account the historical legacy of the 
region. The Caribbean territories began their association with modern society as “the pawn of 
European power politics” or in other words as the “appendage” or “satellite” of European 
imperialism.
8 As European imperial power waned and the Cold War began the United States 
claimed the Caribbean region within its special sphere of influence.  The Manifest Destiny of the 
United States was to dominate the Western Hemisphere. Three distinct historical legacies can be 
identified:  economic dependence, an adversarial political culture and social relations based on 
class and race. The historical development of the region has produced a civilization of a special 
type.  The region is simultaneously characterized by unity and diversity. Its people share a 
common history, a wide culture of music, sport, art, and popular life-style. Yet it is an area 
characterized by “instability; political and economic fragmentation; constitutional diversity; 
economic, psychological, cultural and in some cases political dependence; large-scale 
unemployment; racial tension; potential religious conflicts and the restlessness of youth…”.
9 In 
this milieu regional integration becomes both necessary and problematic. 
  A major challenge is in the area of intra-regional trade. Given historical factors, Caribbean 
economies trade more with Europe and the United States than with one another. For example, 
CARICOM’s intra-regional exports, as a percentage of total exports – which is an index of 
integration – for the years 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990 and 2000 was 8.54 percent; 8.92 percent, 12.99 
percent; 12.37 percent and 15.7 percent respectively.  When compared to other regions this is 
relatively minuscule.  For example, intra-regional exports as a total percentage of total exports in 
the NAFTA region climbed from around 30 percent in 1982 to 58 percent in 2002.
10  
    Uneven development is another factor. Trinidad and Tobago is the dominant exporting 
country in the CARICOM region.  Between 1981 and 2001 that country exported 56.7 percent of 
total intra-regional exports.  Other major exporters were the Organization of Eastern Caribbean 
States (OECS)
11 with 14.1 percent; Barbados with 12.2 percent; Jamaica with 10.4 percent and 
Guyana with 4.2 percent.  During the same period, Jamaica was the dominant importing country 
in terms of intra-regional trade, with approximately 20.9 percent.  The OECS contributed 29.9 
percent of total intra-regional imports; Barbados 17.8 percent; Trinidad and Tobago, 16 percent 
                                                           
    
6Ibid. 36-37. 
    
7 For purposes of this paper the Caribbean refers to the fifteen member states of the Caribbean Community:  Antigua 
& Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica,  Montserrat, St. Kitts & Nevis, 
St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname and Trinidad & Tobago. 
    
8 Eric E. Williams From: Columbus to Castro:  the history of the Caribbean, 1492-1969. (London:  André  Deutsch 
Ltd., 1970) 69. 
    
9 Ibid, 503. 
    
10 Pastor, Robert, A. “North America:  Three Nations, a Partnership or a Community.” Paper presented at the 
Conference The European Union and Regional Integration:  Comparative Perspectives and Lessons for the Americas. 
Miami, April 8 2005, 5. 
    
11 The OECS comprises Antigua & Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia and St. 
Vincent & The Grenadines. 
  5and Guyana, 11.3 percent.
12  What this suggests is that intra-CARICOM trade centers largely 
around Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica which are the two largest economies.  It is necessary to 
note that given small size the CARICOM region has relatively limited capacity to exploit 
economies of scale. This is a major challenge for regional integration. Yet, its very small size 
makes integration a necessity, as argued by proponents of the NRT. Thus the Caribbean’s history 
and geography are simultaneously incentives and disincentives to integration.  
 
The Early Federal Experiment 
 
Although there were very early attempts at integration,
13 the West Indian Federation (1958-62) 
among ten former British colonies is usually cited as one of the key moments in the process of 
Caribbean integration. This early experiment was part of a wider British project which was aimed 
to curtail the costs of empire for a weakened post-war Britain while seeking to minimize the 
impact of decolonialization on the small island economies unable to survive on their own.   
However, a convergence of factors led to the early demise of the Federation in 1962.  Writers 
have cited many political, economic, socio-cultural and geographic factors for the short-lived 
federal venture.
14 One such factor was the position of the Jamaica Labour Party which led to a 
referendum and that country pulling out of the Federation. 
There was also lack of any great commitment by local politicians to cede power to the 
center. In essence, there was unwillingness of insular political leaders “to have the spotlight 
shifted from them to the federal leaders.”
15 Instead what emerged in the twentieth century was a 
fierce sense of nationalism where political leaders had a desire for independence and not to 
belong to a supranational organization.  This was influenced by developments in the post 
emancipation period which saw the rise of nationalist movements in the Caribbean.  The early 
demise of the Federation has left a psychological scar which has contributed to the relatively slow 
pace of integration. 
 
CARICOM: Stepping into or sliding out of the Future? 
 
At the end of 2006 Edward Seaga, the former prime minister of Jamaica, commented on what he 
referred to as “CARICOM sliding out of the future.”
 16  According to Seaga, at the present level, 
the Caribbean Community (CARICOM)
17 functions in “pieces and patches” without any 
overriding authoritative machinery. He observed that all major decisions are made in the “round-
about process of agreement”, first at the level of the cabinets of member governments, then 
regional Heads of Government meetings. Seaga noted that while participating governments are 
willing to meet at the level of Heads of Government and arrive at a consensus on issues, they are 
not willing to cede absolute authority on vital issues which will affect their home base. Seaga 
observed that CARICOM’s answer to the lack of authoritative leadership is the [proposed] 
                                                           
    
12 Caribbean Community Secretariat. CARICOM Our Community. Kingston, Jamaica:  Ian Randle Publishers, 2005, 
115-116 
    
13For example the 1833-1958 Windward Island Federation (Grenada, SVG, St. Lucia and  
Tobago) and the 1871-1956 Leeward Island Federation (Antigua & Barbuda, Montserrat, St. Kitts/Nevis/Anguilla; 
Dominica)   
    
14 Lewis, Gordon K. The Growth of the Modern West Indies. New York:  Monthly Review Press, 1968; Williams, 
1970. 
    
15 Williams, 1970, 513. 
    
16 Edward Seaga.. ‘CARICOM Sliding out of the future.” Jamaica Gleaner. December 31, 2006. 
(http://www.jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20061231/lead/lead8.html) accessed January 19, 2007. 
    
17 Four member states signed the initial Treaty of Chaguaramas which established CARICOM in 1973:  Barbados, 
Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago.  In 1974 CARICOM widened to include thirteen states:  Antigua and 
Barbuda,  Belize, Dominica, Grenada,  Montserrat, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, and Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines. The Commonwealth of the Bahamas became the thirteenth member state in 1983, Suriname, the fourteenth  
in 1995 and Haiti, the fifteenth in 2002.   
  6establishment of a CARICOM Commission with super powerful public officials appointed to take 
decisions in prescribed matters “as if they were a single regional CARICOM Cabinet overriding 
the national executive of member countries.”
18 He cautioned, however, that anyone who believes 
that this would work does not understand the psyche of Caribbean leaders nor, indeed, the people. 
Seaga continued to make the point that those who argue for this structure point to the functioning, 
workable example of the EU. They considered that the success of the EU means that CARICOM 
can work in that way. But, in Seaga’s view, the EU is a relatively homogeneous group of nations 
with all members having broadly similar levels of development. Wide dissimilarities are ruled out 
in the membership process for admission. Member countries have to ensure that they meet the 
minimum criteria for membership. He compared CARICOM today to the early demise of the 
West Indian Federation in 1962 and cautioned that CARICOM is likely to face “a slide, not a 
climb, in the future.”
 19
To what extent does Seaga’s pessimism reflect CARICOM’s reality? CARICOM’s 
Secretary-General, Edwin Carrington, shares a different view. He points out that the recently 
launched Caribbean Single Market (CSM)
20  is the “most ambitious undertaking” that 
CARICOM has ever attempted. Carrington acknowledges that the challenge to sustain Caribbean 
development remains as formidable as ever. However, he contends that CARICOM is “not lying 
down in the face of those challenges. [Instead] the Caribbean is putting its house in order even as 
it reaches out to strengthen its ties with its traditional partners and to develop stronger links with 
the new ones…”
21  
The above represent two extreme views.  This paper seeks to offer a balanced account of 
the state of Caribbean integration.  To do so, this section looks at the three goals of CARICOM as 
outlined in the 1973 Treaty of Chaguaramas: economic integration; functional cooperation and 




Economic integration is problematic for CARICOM. The 1973 Treaty of Chaguaramas provided 
for a common market which never materialized within the first thirty years of CARICOM.   
Cognizant of global imperatives, CARICOM Heads of Government through the 1989 Grand Anse 
Declaration decided on a Caribbean Single Market and Economy  (CSME) ‘in the shortest 
possible time’.  After several setbacks the Caribbean Single Market (CSM) was launched in 2006 
and the single economy is scheduled to come on stream in 2015.  Some of the key elements of the 
CSME include: 
♦  The free movement of goods and services  (currently over 95 percent of goods move 
freely across the region);  
♦  The right of establishment, to permit the establishment of CARICOM-owned businesses 
in any member state without restrictions and on the same terms as national enterprises; 
♦  A common external tariff,  which is a rate of duty applied by all member states of the 
single market on entry of a product from a country, which is not a member of the single 
market; 
♦  Free circulation – which refers to the free movement among member states of goods 
imported from extra-regional sources.  This would require collection of duties only at 
                                                           
    
18 Ibid. 
    
19 Ibid. 
    
20 On January 30, 2006 six CARICOM member states – Jamaica, Barbados, Belize, Guyana, Suriname and Trinidad 
and Tobago signed the formal declaration signalling the launch of the CARICOM Single Market (CSM). In June of that 
same year, other member states, with the exception of Haiti, Montserrat and The Commonwealth of The Bahamas, 
became members of the CSM.  
    
21 CARICOM Secretariat.  Keynote Address by His Excellency Edwin W. Carrington, Secretary-General, Caribbean 
Community, at the 30
th Annual Miami Conference on the Caribbean Basin, 4-6 December, 2006, Miami, Florida.  
  7first point of entry into the single market and the establishment of arrangements for 
sharing of customs revenue collected from these goods among the countries to which 
they are consigned (this aspect is still to be developed); 
♦  A common trade policy which refers to agreement among the members on matters related 
to internal and international trade and a coordinated external trade policy negotiated on a 
joint basis; 
♦  Free movement of labor which involves the removal of work permits,
22 hassle-free travel, 
providing for the transfer of social security benefits, harmonizing social services, such as 
education and health and establishing common standards and measures for accreditation 
and equivalency of qualifications and skills.  In the first phase the free movement of 
persons is restricted to the following categories:  university graduates, media workers, 
sports persons, musicians, artistes, managers, supervisors and other service providers. 
[Teachers and nurses were added to the list in 2006].  
♦  Harmonization of laws which include the harmonization of company, intellectual 
property and other laws; 
♦  Economic policy measures to include coordinating and converging macro-economic 
policies and performances; harmonizing foreign investment policy and adopting 
measures to acquire, develop and transfer appropriate technology; 
♦  Monetary policy measures which involves coordinating exchange rate and interests rate 
policies as well as the commercial banking market; and 




  Since the CSM is in its infancy it is too early to assess its viability.  However while it has 
the potential to benefit the region in the long term, there are some initial challenges.  For example 
the smaller economies which comprise the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) 
delayed entry into the CSM on the question of development fund.  Chapter seven of the Revised 
Treaty of Chaguaramas makes provision for disadvantaged countries, regions and sectors.  Article 
142 (1) states: 
     The provisions of this Chapter shall have effect for the purpose of establishing 
a regime for disadvantaged countries, regions and sectors within the framework 
of the Treaty as well as a special regime for the Less Developed Countries in 
order to enhance their prospects for successful competition within the 
Community, and redress, to the extent possible, any negative impact of the 
establishment of the CSME.
24
The NRT does argue that social stability is a key aspect of development regionalism.  It advances 
the idea that development regionalism includes the allocation of regional funds to support less 
developed economies within the regional movement. However, unlike the EU, CARICOM is a 
grouping of small developing countries and although the Revised Treaty provides for a 
development fund, the pressing question is, who would fund the development fund?  To date 
Trinidad and Tobago and Barbados have made modest commitments to the fund and the 
Caribbean Development Bank is working out modalities for its implementation. But this is a 
troublesome issue for CARICOM. 
 
The Girvan Report – Toward a Single Economic Space and Development Vision 
 
                                                           
    
22 A CARICOM passport has been designed and Suriname was the first member state to issue one in January 2005.  
Caribbean Community Secretariat. CARICOM Our Community. Kingston, (Jamaica:  Ian Randle Publishers, 2005) 245. 
    
24“Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas Establishing the Caribbean Community Including the CARICOM Single Market 
& Economy” (Georgetown, Guyana:  CARICOM Secretariat) 93. 
  8In terms of the way forward, at its Eighteenth Inter-Sessional Meeting held in February 2007, 
CARICOM Heads of Government adopted a paper entitled “Towards a Single Economy and a 
Single Development Vision” as a framework for the further elaboration of the single economy, 
with the understanding that refinements will have to be done in time for final sign off at the 
Regular Meeting of the Conference in July 2007.  It was agreed, however, that the Single Vision 
would be used as the basis for a comprehensive development plan.
25 The ‘Girvan Report’, as it is 
called, recommends a single development vision for sustainable development which should be 
holistic; encompassing development in all its dimensions – economic, social, environmental and 
governance dimensions.
26  This is a step in the right direction, since as the NRT purports, 
regionalism in the South must be concerned with development. The Report suggests sequencing 
of the CSME as follows:   
Phase I (2005-mid 2008) consolidation of the single market and initiation of the single economy.  
Phase II (2009-2015) consolidation and completion of the single economy. This phase will 
include – 
¾  implementation of common policies in energy related industries, agriculture, sustainable 
tourism and agro-tourism, transport and small and medium enterprises; 
¾  Harmonization of taxation systems, incentives, and financial and regulatory 
environment; 
¾  Harmonization of fiscal and monetary policies; 
¾  Implementation of Regional Competition Policy and Regional Intellectual Property 
Regime; 
¾  Implementation of CARICOM Monetary Union
27 
This is ambitious, particularly monetary union, given the vast differences in the various 
currencies within the CARICOM region (See Table 1.).  
 
Table 1:  CARICOM Currencies 
Country  Currency  Equivalency to the US$1 
    
The Bahamas  Bahamian dollar  Bah$1 
Barbados Barbadian  dollar  Bar$2 
Belize Belizean  dollar  BZ$2 
Guyana Guyana  dollar  G$195.34*   
Haiti Gourde G41*   
Jamaica Jamaican  dollar  J$58.24* 
Suriname  Suriname Guilder  SF$2,540**   
Trinidad and Tobago  Trinidad and Tobago dollar  TT$6.2** 
The OECS  East Caribbean dollar  EC$2.7 
  *Floating (2003) 
  **Floating (2002)    
Source:  Caricom Secretariat, 2005, 405 
                                                           
    
25 CARICOM Secretariat, Press Release 48/2007 “Communiqué Issued at the Conclusion of the Eighteenth Inter-
Sessional Meeting of the Conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), 12-14 
February 2007, Kingstown, St. Vincent and the Grenadines. 
    
26 “Towards a Single Economy and Single Development Vision”, Report by Norman Girvan, University of the West 
Indies in collaboration with the CARICOM Secretariat and the special Task Force on the Single Economy, October 25, 
2006,  8 
    
27 Ibid, 47. 
  9 
   As is the case in the EU, monetary union takes time, given currency differentials.  Also, a 
country’s currency is an important aspect of its sovereignty.  Currently of the EU-15 Britain, 
Denmark and Sweden are still not members of the euro zone. CARICOM will do well to draw 
lessons from the EU in this regard. 
  Despite limitations, the Girvan report notes that the expected benefits of the CSME include 
“greater efficiency in both the private and public sectors, higher levels of domestic and foreign 
investment, increased employment, and growth in intra-regional trade and of extra-regional 
exports.
28
          However it points to three caveats: 
1.  The CSME cannot be ‘all things to all men’ 
2.  [CARICOM] should be careful not to expect or promise more from the CSME than it can 
realistically deliver, so as not to create disappointment at a later stage 
3.  Most of the development effort of member states will continue to be made nationally and 
sub-regionally which is where much of CSME implementation will take place. The 
CSME will not substitute for national strategies rather it will complement them.
29 
    The Report observes a major challenge which relates to the disconnect between the people 
and the regional project.  It refers to an ‘information deficit’ among the citizens of the 
Community. The Report notes that some citizens are cynical about the slow pace of 
implementation [of the CSME], while others are apprehensive about the possible adverse effects 
of increased competition for jobs and markets. The Report goes on to state that the people of the 
Community need to be assured that the economic benefits of integration will be broadly spread 
across and within countries, as well as across social groups.  They also need to be assured that 
integration will make a difference to ‘quality of life’ issues such as crime, health and education.
30  
In the case of the EU similar concerns have been raised.Yet despite concerns Prime Minister of 
Barbados, Owen Arthur indicated that: 
      The creation of a Caribbean Single Market and Economy is a historic necessity 
which must be brought to full fruition, no matter how arduous the task may at times 
appear, how negligible the immediate returns, or how vast the pitfalls and obstacles that 
threaten to ensnarl it.  It offers the societies of the region, individually and collectively, 
the only realistic and viable option by which to achieve sustainable development, and in 
the process the prospect of erasing the two great economic deficits which confront the 
region at the start of this new century.
31
However, some commentators question the viability of a single market and economy 
without steps toward greater polity unity. Prime Minister Gonsalves poses a critical question: 
“Does not the single economy require the creation of an appropriate supra-national entity to 
which there ought to be a transfer of a measure of sovereignty, in its pooling, similar, though not 
necessarily identical, to that of fashioning the European Union?” 
32 Gonsalves further elaborates: 
          The course we have taken to view CARICOM as a community of independent 
sovereign states, that is, if we proceed without a supranational authority to which some 
measure of sovereignty is transferred to direct the operation we can still succeed but it 
will take much longer and there will be greater pain and frustration.  We have chosen to 
proceed in the most difficult way to a single market and economy.  We ought to do it 
                                                           
    
28 Ibid, 6. 
    
29 Ibid, 8 
    
30 Ibid, 6-7. 
    
31 Own Arthur. “Implementation of the CARICOM Single Market and Economy, and its Implications for US-
CARICOM Economic relations.”  Feature Address to the American Business and Consulting Group Special 
Symposium, Brooklyn,  New York, April 2, 2004. Prime Minister Arthur has lead responsibility for the CSME in the 
CARICOM Quasi Cabinet. 
    
32 Ralph Gonsalves is the current Prime Minister of St. Vincent and the Grenadines. 
 10the way the Europeans have done it, to transfer some measure of sovereignty to a 
supranational entity through a single law in the independent states and have that 
particular supranational entity provide directives to drive the CSME.   Instead, what we 
are seeking to do is to see if whilst we are being a community of independent states that 
we can have a measure of supranationality without in fact creating a central 
supranational authority…
33
             Havelock Brewster, a leading Caribbean scholar, also questions whether a Single Market 
and Economy is realistic without some measure of political unity. He also cites the EU model as a 
reference point for CARICOM.
34
             Therefore,  a  weakness  of  the CSME relates to the institutional arrangements which 
should be in place to facilitate deeper economic integration.  The establishment of the Caribbean 
Court of Justice (CCJ) in 2005 as a dispute settlement mechanism is a step in the right direction. 
However more needs to be done.  Recognizing this deficiency, in 2003, through the Rose Hall 
Declaration, CARICOM Heads of Government took the initiative to develop a system of ‘mature 
regionalism’ in which critical policy decisions will have the force of law throughout the region as 
a result of the operation of domestic legislation and the revision of the Treaty of Chaguaramas 
and the authority of the CCJ in its original jurisdiction, taking into account the constitutional 
provisions of member states.  Since 2003 a number of committees have been set up to advance 
the Rose Hall Declaration, which decided on the need for an Executive Commission to address 
the “implementation paralysis” within CARICOM.
35   
Currently the Report of the Technical Working Group (TWG) on Governance on 
‘Managing Mature Regionalism, is high on CARICOM’s agenda.  The Report indicates that “A 
critical element in the effort to advance the integration process is the need to devise suitable 
structures of regional governance to manage an integrated economic space. This must be based on 
a pragmatic approach to regional decision-making, since the promotion of the goals of economic 
integration presupposes an increasing degree of political consensus aimed at facilitating the 
achievement of agreed objectives.”
36 The Report recommends a CARICOM Commission 
comprising three members and a President to “exercise full executive responsibility for the 
implementation of decisions relating to the CSME and any other areas of the integration process 
as the Conference of Heads of Government may from time to time determine and to initiate 
proposals for Community action in such areas.”
37 The TWG also recommends the abolition of the 
Community Council. Instead it proposes that the various sectoral ministerial councils should be 
directed by the Heads of Government to exercise, to the maximum, their decision-making 
responsibilities. It also recommends that the Commission will encompass the structure of the 
CARICOM Secretariat. 
The TWA notes that: 
     …the  Caribbean  Community  has  not yet achieved the level of integration 
experienced by the European Union.  Nevertheless, we believe that some of the 
principles and practices involved in the operation of the latter are quite relevant to 
Caribbean current and future integration requirements and could, therefore, be adapted 
in an effort to improve the effectiveness of governance in the Caribbean Community. In 
particular, consideration should be given to the adoption of a system that differentiates 
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 11leally among specific kinds of Community decision-making:  viz. regulations, 
directives, decisions, and recommendations and opinions.
38
The TWG recommends that it is useful to apply the principle of ‘proportionality’ utilised 
by the EU.  This stipulates that the content of and the institutional arrangements devised for 
Community action shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Revised 
Treaty. The group also recommends that this should be supported by the principle of 
‘subsidiarity’ which is also utilised by the EU. This principle asserts that regional action would 
not be pursued in cases where action by individual member states is sufficient to achieve the 
specified goals of the Community and these states demonstrate a commitment to pursue such 
action. 
39  Nonetheless the TWG recommends that CARICOM continues to be a community of 
sovereign states, which reinforces the inter-governmental nature of the regional project. It does, 
however, propose the passing of a Single Caribbean Act by the parliaments of member states 
which will permit the reception of Community Law in the jurisdictions of member states.
40  It 
also recommends the strengthening of the Assembly of Caribbean Community Parliamentarians 
to address the democratic deficiencies in CARICOM and automacity of financing to improve the 
financial arrangements of CARICOM, as is the case in the EU.. 
The Conference of Heads of Government considered the Report of the TWG at its recent 
Inter-sessional meeting in February, 2007 and agreed that member states should consider the 
policy issues and recommendations contained in the report and the wide-ranging consultations 
should be held with other stakeholders including the parliamentary Opposition and Civil Society 
before the submissions of their positions to the Secretary-General.
41 Though different in content 
to some degree, this report is akin to the 1992 Time for Action which recommended elements of 
the EU model for CARICOM.  The question is, would the report be implemented?  As Time for 
Action noted, CARICOM had become associated with “inordinate delay and indecisiveness, with 
bureaucracy, with meetings which generate rhetoric and paper but spur little action that makes a 
difference.”
42 The challenge for CARICOM, in the economic realm, is to shift from integration 
on paper to action on the ground. This will require serious re-design of the institutional structure, 




It is widely accepted that CARICOM has done best in the area of functional cooperation, 
particularly in the areas of health, education, sports and culture.  Particularly in the area of health, 
the Pan Caribbean Partnership against HIV/AIDS has been instrumental in the fight against the 
pandemic.  The Caribbean is currently hosting the 2007 Cricket World Cup (CWC).  This has 
brought to the fore the question of security.  A common CARICOM visa has been issued and 
there is a regional approach to managing the event.  According to Barbados’ deputy prime 
minister, who chairs the CWC security commitee: 
     Sometimes you need catalysts to bring about transformation in society. There is no 
doubt in my mind that the challenges of trying to keep the region secure during Cricket 
World Cup will come to be regarded as one of the major catalysts in the integration 
movement of the region.
43
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 12CARICOM Heads of Government have gone a step further and have recently recognised security 
as the fourth pillar of the Community.
44 This is timely given the non-traditional security threats 
which plague the region, such as the illicit drug trade, violence and criminality and the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic. It is necessary to note that the discourse on security in the Caribbean is framed within 
the alternative paradigm which seeks to broaden the definition of security beyond the military 
sphere. 
45 As Griffith observes, security is multi-dimensional and has never been viewed merely 
as protection from military threats. He defines security as protection and preservation of a 
people’s freedom from external military attack and coercion, from internal subversion and from 
the erosion of cherished political, economic and social values.  Within this framework, security 
becomes critical to survival, not only for the viability of the state but also for socio-economic 
development. Griffith has used the case of illicit drug trafficking to illustrate how non-traditional 
security threats can undermine development.
46 As the Girvan Report notes functional cooperation 
in non-economic spheres needs to be recognised as an integral part of the CSME.  
 
Foreign Policy Coordination 
 
On the question of foreign policy coordination, there has been mixed results. CARICOM played a 
leading role in initiating the negotiations for the Lomé Conventions. It also benefited from 
collective diplomacy in the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization 
(GATT/WTO), the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the 
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) negotiations as well as in various 
commissions and joint councils with Canada, Cuba, Japan, Mexico, the United States, the 
Organization of American States (OAS), the G3 (Columbia, Venezuela and Mexico), among 
others.  In addition, by trading each others’ support, the CARICOM countries succeeded in 
getting their nations elected to key international positions, such as Commonwealth Secretary-
General and ACP Secretary-General. CARICOM has also been successful in assisting with 
territorial disputes in the region.
47  Currently CARICOM has a collective cooperative relationship 
with Cuba, despite pressures from the United States. According to Barbados’ foreign minister: 
            We embrace Cuba as a bona fide sister-state in the Caribbean region and are 
committed to a policy of constructive engagement with its government and people.  We 
do not believe that efforts to isolate Cuba, through exclusion from participation in 
hemispheric bodies like the OAS or the emerging Free Trade Area of the Americas 
(FTAA) or measures that create greater hardship for the Cuban people, such as a fifty-
year long economic embargo, will foster change in Cuba….  We cannot accept “regime 
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 13change” exogenously imposed upon the people of Cuba, to be, in any way, a viable 
option.
48
This spirit of solidarity with Cuba has underpinned CARICOM-Cuba relations.  In this 
respect, CARICOM has spearheaded lobbying efforts for Cuba to be fully inserted into the 
hemispheric and wider international system.  For example, CARICOM lobbied successfully for 
Cuba to be a founding member of the Association of Caribbean States (ACS).  CARICOM was 
also at the forefront of the efforts which led to Cuba’s successful application for membership in 
the African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group in 1999. According to the CARICOM Secretariat 
CARICOM, strongly, though unsuccessfully promoted within the ACP and in negotiations with 
the EU, the admission of Cuba to the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement.
49
As such, Cuba is the only Caribbean country that does not enjoy a bilateral cooperation 
agreement with the EU since Cuba became a member of the ACP and a member of 
CARIFORUM in October 2001 without being a signatory to the Cotonou Agreement.  Roy refers 
to this as an anomaly where Cuba belongs to an exclusive golf club without being able to play 
golf. However, Cuba is an observer within the Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery 
(CRNM) and an active participant in CARIFORUM.
50
Within this spirit of cooperation, in 1993 CARICOM and Cuba signed an agreement 
which established the CARICOM-Cuba Joint Commission.  The objectives of which were to 
promote cooperative relations between the Caribbean Community and Cuba in economic, social, 
cultural and technological fields.  In this regard it was agreed that the members of CARICOM 
and Cuba will seek a greater understanding of each others’ views and positions on issues which 
may arise in the various regional and international forums, in an effort to promote closer 
relations. It was further agreed that the Joint Commission will meet once a year alternately in a 
CARICOM member state and Cuba.
51  
CARICOM also had a generally collective stance with regard to the Haitian controversy 
in 2004.  CARICOM deplored the removal of Aristide from office as setting “a dangerous 
precedent for democratically-elected governments anywhere and everywhere as it promotes the 
removal of duly-elected persons from office by the power of rebel forces….” CARICOM 
questioned whether Aristide’s resignation was truly voluntary, as it came after the capture of 
sections of Haiti by armed insurgents and the failure of the international community to provide 
the requisite support, despite appeals from CARICOM.
52   
  With respect to Venezuela, most CARICOM countries have engaged in cooperative 
arrangements with the Chavez administration. In a recent visit to St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
President Chavez called for Caribbean countries to join him in his fight against imperialism.  He 
argued that the Caribbean should be ‘a sea of resistance to imperalism’.
53 Venezuela has given 
assistance to CARICOM countries particularly in the area of infrastructural development and 
energy through the Petro Caribe initiative.  However, this has ignited tensions with Trinidad and 
Tobago which is a key CARICOM member and the region’s only energy producer.  Guyana has 
decided to satisfy its energy needs from both Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela.  At the end of 
the recent Rio Conference Prime Minister Manning of Trinidad and Tobago indicated that his 
country and Venezuela need to work closer together to ensure energy security in the region.     
                                                           
    
48 United Nations,  “Statement by the Honorable Dame Billy A Miller, Senior Minister and Minister of Foreign 
Affairs and Foreign Trade of Barbados to the 59
th Session of the United Nations General Assembly,” (New York, 
September 27 2004), 5-6. 
    
49 CARICOM, 2005, 31. 
    
50 Joaquín Roy “The European Union Perception of Cuba:  From Frustration to Irritation.” Jean Monnet/Robert 
Schuman Working Paper Series Vol. 3 No. 2.  (Miami, August, 2003) 8 
    
51 CARICOM Secretariat,  “Agreement Establishing  the Caribbean Community-Cuba Joint Commission,” 
December 13 1993. (http://www.caricom.org/archives/agreement_caricom-cuba-jointcommission.htm) accessed April 
27 2005. 
    
52 Jamaica Gleaner, “This sets a dangerous precedent” March 1 2004. 
    
53 Barbadian Nation “Join me in Fight” 18 February, 2007. 
 14Some observers have however cautioned against Caribbean countries’ close association 
with Chavez. According to Ronald Sanders,  
      …President  Chavez  is  a  very  volatile man whose policies toward a number of 
Caribbean countries should be analyzed beyond his anti-American rhetoric and the 
supposed largesse of his Petro Caribe initiative to supply oil to several countries… The 
Petro Caribe initiative is itself worrying.  For, while it has the veneer of a good deal, all 
that it offers is deferred payment of a portion of the world price for Venezuelan oil.  It 
may help the governments with immediate cash-flow problems but it is increasing their 
national debt and mortgaging the future of their countries to Venezuela… Caribbean 
countries have suffered for decades from the imposition of the will of the United States, 
it is right that they should try to resist it.  But, they must also be careful of the ambitions 
of another potential [sub-hemispheric] hegemon.”
54  
Dominica’s prime minister indicates, however, that “we shall make no apologies that 
President Chavez is our friend and the people of Venezuela are our friends.”
55 Given the US 
preoccupation with the Middle East, and its benign neglect of the region, CARICOM has the 
political space to constructively engage Cuba and Venezuela.  
 
Conclusions   
 
In the contemporary global political economy, regional integration is an imperative for 
development. As proponents of the New Regionalism Theory (NRT) argue, however, the 
motivations for integration in the North are different from that in the South.  While regional 
schemes such as the EU are consolidating their regional projects to better rule the world and 
compete for power in the Core, regional movements in the South are concerned with collective 
survival, resisting domination and strengthening their bargaining position in the global arena.  
This paper used the case of CARICOM to address the questions: what types of regional 
projects are emerging in the South and to what extent are they modeled after the EU? It examined 
CARICOM along three dimensions: economic integration, functional cooperation and foreign 
policy coordination. However to understand the current state of Caribbean integration, the early 
federal experiment cannot be ignored.  The Caribbean ‘benefited’ from British tutelage.  In 
essence the British encouraged ‘bureaucratic/ administration integration’ and promoted low cost 
low risk integration.
56 To date, CARICOM is struggling to break away from that historical mole.  
In terms of economic integration, as the case showed the Caribbean Single Market and 
Economy (CSME) is the pulse of Caribbean integration.  Given it small size and the harsh 
realities of the global environment, CARICOM has an incentive to deepen economic integration, 
hence the CSME. As The Girvan Report shows CARICOM is attempting to move towards a 
single economy and development vision.  This supports the NRT which argues that countries in 
the periphery have to by necessity pursue development regionalism:  the sufficient size argument; 
the need for self-reliance; the question of credibility; to enhance collective bargaining; to foster 
social stability; to promote environmental sustainability and to encourage democracy. This focus 
on development is a positive step forward. Are there any reasons to worry? There always are. 
While it is generally understood that development regionalism is necessary, the challenge will be 
to put recommendations into action and to create the institutional framework and political culture 
necessary to support this type of integration.   
Since CARICOM is a Community of sovereign states which function within an inter-
governmental framework, implementation is difficult.  This is one major difference between 
CARICOM and the EU. While the EU pursues inter-governmentalism and supranationalism, 
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 15CARICOM is almost purely inter-governmental (except for the Caribbean Court of Justice which 
is in its infancy).  Nonetheless, the 2006 report of the Technical Working Group on Governance, 
like the Time for Action report which preceeded it fourteen years earlier,   has proposed elements 
of the EU model for CARICOM.  It recommends, for example, an Executive Commission; an 
enhanced role for the Assembly of Caribbean Community Parliamentarians, a Single Caribbean 
Act, the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity.  If this report is adopted, it should help to 
reduce the ‘implementation paralysis’ which has slowed down the pace of Caribbean integration. 
It would also shift the emerging CARICOM model closer to aspects of the EU model. 
Another challenge to the CSME relates to uneven development within CARICOM. 
Unlike the EU, which can financially afford structural and cohesion funds, it is problematic to 
meet the treaty provisions for a development fund, since CARICOM comprises relatively poor 
countries. Therefore, for CARICOM integration must by necessity go beyond the economic 
question. This again speaks to the differences between regional projects in the developed and 
developing worlds.   
Another deficiency relates to the ‘information deficit’ and the disconnect between the 
ordinary people and the CSME.  This is one similarity that CARICOM shares with the EU and it 
is one feature that CARICOM should not emulate from the EU. Steps should be put in place to 
improve the democratic character of the regional movement to ensure that people are put at the 
centre of integration to ensure participation and greater social cohesion and security. Further 
research is needed on the question of democracy and integration. Does popular consultation slow 
down the pace of integration?  Does an elitist approach facilitate the advancement of integration?   
  It is noteworthy that security is now the fourth pillar of CARICOM.  This is a step toward 
deeper regionalism.   It is necessary to emphasis that in the case of the Caribbean security goes 
beyond the military sphere to include human, societal and environmental security. When 
compared to the EU, security generally relates to ‘high politics’ such as the role of NATO and the 
dynamics of the trans-Atlantic relationship.  This again speaks to the differences between 
regionalisms in the developed and developing worlds. There is need for further research on the 
question of regionalism and security, particularly as it relates to the Global South. 
  With regard to functional cooperation, CARICOM has been relatively successful, 
particularly in the areas of health, education, disaster management, sports and culture.  The EU 
has been instrumental in providing aid to CARICOM and to individual member states in many 
functional areas. Caribbean countries have also received financial bilateral assistance from 
individual EU member states; most notably the British. It is necessary to note that the European 
Partnership Agreements (EPA) which is being negotiated between the EU and CARIFORUM, 
makes provision for financial assistance to advance regional integration.   
In terms of foreign policy CARICOM is engaged in controversial relationships, 
particularly with Cuba and Venezuela. This reflects two factors.  First, given the Caribbean’s 
history of external domination – through slavery and colonialism – it has almost always adopted a 
foreign policy stance of Third World solidarity.  Second, foreign policy in the Caribbean is for the 
most part linked to development needs. Therefore, by necessity it has to engage in diplomatic 
maneuvering for its survival. On the question of foreign policy CARICOM has had mixed results.  
There is need for further research on regionalism and foreign policy options in the developing 
world. 
In summary, the case of CARICOM suggests that regional integration in the South is of a 
special type.  It is riddled by historical ghosts. It is reactionary to external forces and must go 
beyond the economic dimension. Consequently foreign policy becomes a strong tool in the 
region’s collective bargaining with the rest of the world.  
The case also suggests that regional projects cannot ignore the EU model of integration, 
since it represents some basic ingredients for success – common institutions, political leadership 
and vision, financial commitment to integration, among others.  In the case of CARICOM the 
1992 Time for Action proposed aspects of the EU model. This report was initially ignored and 
 16later implemented in part. Currently, fourteen years on, another report is proposing similar 
recommendations along the lines of the EU. It is necessary to note that whereas the EU does 
provide a reference point for integration, it should not be mimicked. CARICOM has to find its 
own path, while drawing lessons from the EU.  This paper argues that CARICOM has not yet 
come of age. However, it has not died in infancy either. It has moved beyond functional 
cooperation, but it is proceeding with the process of integration within a minimalist framework, 
given the problematic of political union.  Time will tell to what extent CARICOM will step into 
or slide out of the future. I remain cautiously hopeful. 
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